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Abstract
Psychiatry has witnessed a new wave of approaches to clinical phenotyping and the
study of psychopathology, including the National Institute of Mental Health’s Research
Domain Criteria, clinical staging, network approaches, the Hierarchical Taxonomy of
Psychopathology,  and the general  psychopathology factor,  as well  as a revival  of
interest in phenomenological psychopathology. The question naturally emerges as to
what the relationship between these new approaches is – are they mutually exclusive,
competing approaches, or can they be integrated in some way and used to enrich
each other? In this opinion piece, we propose a possible integration between clinical
staging  and  phenomenological  psychopathology.  Domains  identified  in
phenomenological psychopathology, such as selfhood, embodiment, affectivity, etc.,
can be overlaid  on clinical  stages in  order  to  enrich and deepen the phenotypes
captured in clinical staging (‘high resolution’ clinical phenotypes). This approach may
be  useful  both  ideographically  and  nomothetically,  in  that  it  could  complement
diagnosis, enrich clinical formulation, and inform treatment of individual patients, as
well as help guide aetiological, prediction, and treatment research. The overlaying of
phenomenological  domains on clinical  stages may require that these domains are
reformulated  in  dimensional  rather  than  categorial  terms.  This  integrative  project
requires assessment tools, some of which are already available, that are sensitive
and  thorough  enough  to  pick  up  on  the  range  of  relevant  psychopathology.  The
proposed approach offers opportunities for mutual enrichment: clinical staging may be
enriched  by  introducing  greater  depth  to  phenotypes;  phenomenological
psychopathology may be  enriched  by  introducing  stages of  severity  and disorder
progression to phenomenological analysis.
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In a recent publication, Maj (1) argues that in psychiatry, in contrast to other medical
specialities,  the  information  conveyed  by  diagnosis  is  insufficient  in  itself  for
therapeutic and prognostic purposes. Maj argues that there is, therefore, a pressing
need for a more detailed clinical characterisation of the individual case and that the
field  should  start  to  promote  the  construction  and  validation  of  tools  that
systematically guide the clinician and researcher in this characterisation. The field has
witnessed a new wave of approaches to researching psychopathology, including the
National  Institute  of  Mental  Health  (NIMH)’s  Research  Domain  Criteria  (RDoC),
clinical staging, network approaches, the Hierarchical Taxonomy of Psychopathology
(HiToP), and the general psychopathology (‘P’) factor, as well as a revival of interest
in  phenomenological  psychopathology.  Several  of  these  approaches  have  been
presented as “alternatives” to the DSM/ICD approach to psychiatric diagnosis, on the
grounds that they have more robust validity and utility in aetiological research and in
guiding treatment decision-making  (1-3). Maj, however, argues that they are in fact
unlikely  to  replace current  diagnostic  practices,  but  may  be  able  to  complement
current  diagnoses  by  significantly  improving  clinical  characterisation  of  individual
cases and groups of patients (i.e., clinical phenotyping). 
The  question  naturally  emerges  as  to  what  the  relationship  between  these  new
approaches is – are they mutually exclusive, competing approaches, or can they be
integrated  in  some way  and  used  to  enrich  each  other  for  the  purpose  of  more
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detailed and useful clinical phenotyping? In this opinion piece, we propose a possible
integration between clinical staging and phenomenological  psychopathology. While
the focus here is on exploring the possibility of integrating these two approaches, a
similar  question  could  be  asked  with  regard  to  the  other  approaches  (e.g.,  the
relationship between RDoC and HiTOP). We argue that this integration has two key
advantages for clinical staging: 1) it adds depth and nuance to stage-based clinical
phenotypes;  2)  it  facilitates  both  idiographic  and nomothetic  understanding of  the
condition in question (i.e., an understanding of the particular patient and of the more
general  condition).  To explain  this  proposal,  we briefly  outline the clinical  staging
model and the approach of phenomenological psychopathology, particularly how it
can be applied in dimensional terms, before turning to their potential integration.
In brief,  clinical staging  attempts to determine the position of an individual along a
continuum of illness, defined according to stages: Stage 0 = no current symptoms,
Stage 1a = help-seeking with distress, Stage 1b = attenuated (i.e.,  sub-threshold)
syndrome, Stages 2-4 = full  threshold disorder with varying degrees of recurrence
and severity (see Figure 1a for illustration)(3-5). While criteria can certainly be used to
define these clinical stages [e.g., see (6-9)], part of the clinical appeal of the staging
model is that clinical stage can be readily judged based on symptom severity and
extension. Clinical staging takes a quasi-dimensional approach to symptomatology; it
delineates  step  changes  on  top  of  continuous  transdiagnostic  symptomatology  to
guide treatment decision-making, prediction, and aetiological research. As illustrated
in Figure 1 (panel A), clinical staging takes a transdiagnostic approach by delineating
illness stages across symptom domains (psychosis, mood, anxiety symptoms, etc.),
rather than being wed to traditional diagnostic categories. This accommodates the
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mixed  clinical  presentations  and  high  levels  of  comorbidity  frequently  seen,
particularly  in  the  early  stages  of  disorder,  as  well  as  fluctuating  and  heterotypic
clinical trajectories (e.g., a Stage 1b clinical presentation characterised by anxiety and
mood symptoms evolving into a Stage 2 disorder with prominent psychotic symptoms)
(3,  10,  11).  In  contrast  to  the  DSM/ICD,  clinical  staging,  in  principle,  allows  for
personalised  treatments  based  on  specific  combinations  of  symptoms  and  their
degree of severity and differentiation (e.g., while a Stage 1b patient with attenuated
psychotic symptoms and mood symptoms might be treated with cognitive-behaviour
therapy  and  an  antidepressant  medication,  a  Stage  2  patient  with  predominant
psychotic  symptoms  might  be  treated  with  an  antipsychotic  medication  and
psychosocial support). However, while the concepts behind clinical staging are sound,
its success requires that symptoms are clearly described and defined. In other words,
the personalised interventions and advances in prediction and aetiological research
promised by clinical staging are likely to require ‘high resolution’ capture of psychiatric
symptoms and signs,  i.e.,  phenotypic  depth and nuance (12).  We argue that  this
phenotypic  depth  and  nuance  can  be  provided  by  phenomenological
psychopathology.
Emerging  from  the  philosophical  tradition  of  phenomenology,  phenomenological
psychopathology is an interdisciplinary research program that describes and classifies
experiential  disturbances  in  mental  disorders  (i.e.,  characteristic  features  of  the
experience  and  expression  of  mental  disorders)(13)[see  Appendix,  p.2].
Phenomenological  psychopathologists often operate within a categorial  framework,
articulating  the  experiential  disturbances  characteristic  of,  for  example,  bipolar
disorder  or  schizophrenia.  However,  many  phenomenological  psychopathologists
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share psychiatry’s scepticism about current diagnostic categories (13). Some of these
researchers now use phenomenology to distinguish experiential  disturbances both
within and  across  traditional diagnostic  categories.  In  contrast  to  the  DSM/ICD
approach,  and arguably  also  new approaches to  clinical  characterisation  such as
RDoC and HiToP, phenomenological psychopathology is based on well-articulated
accounts of  ‘normal’  or  ‘healthy’  experience.  So, rather than start  an investigation
from a DSM/ICD category, these research studies typically start from basic, elemental
features  of  human subjectivity  that  have  been  identified  in  the  phenomenological
tradition.  These overlapping features  are  thought  of  as  constituting or  making up
conscious  life.  Some  of  the  structures  of  experience  commonly  studied  by
phenomenological psychopathologists are: 1. selfhood, including the tacit  sense of
ownership and agency of one’s experience and behaviour, as well as the narrative
construction of a social identity; 2. intersubjectivity, including the capacity to perceive
and  engage  with  other  human  beings  as  expressive  subjects,  rather  than  mere
objects; 3. embodiment, including the capacity to shift between experiences of one’s
body as a power of engaging with the world (Leib) and as a material object (Körper);
4. affectivity, including resonance with and attunement to one’s environment through
moods and emotions; 5. understanding, including the way one tacitly interprets and
makes sense of everyday objects and environments; 6. temporality, including the tacit
anticipation and retention of experiences, which constitutes the lived flow of time; and
7.  spatiality,  including  one’s  capacity  to  appreciate  and  operate  within  different
normative spaces, such as the space of the home, the theatre, the classroom, and so
on. The term ‘existential structures’ is used to refer to these features because they
are thought to structure or organise our experience (14-16)[see Appendix, p.1].
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Each existential structure has a diverse range of states in which they might be for a
given individual at a given time. For example, the existential structure of affectivity
may be expressed in anxiety, boredom, or joy; the existential structure of temporality
may be expressed in eager anticipation or slowly whiling away the time. Moreover,
existential structures may undergo more fundamental disturbances. For example, a
person may partially lose the capacity to be affectively attuned through moods; or, in
the case of temporality, a person may undergo a fundamental disturbance in their
capacity  to  retain  and  anticipate  experiences.  Typically,  phenomenological
psychopathologists identify an existential structure (or set of existential structures) to
frame their study, but they aim to describe the particular way in which it manifests in
the condition in question. For instance, Martin and colleagues (17) examined bipolar
disorder through the lens of temporality and focus on the particular ways in which the
experience of  time is  disturbed in  this  disorder  and how these disturbances may
negatively impact insight and reasoning in manic episodes.
The  existential  structures  can  form  domains for  dimensional  phenomenological
research, which would in some ways be analogous to the RDoC domains (see (14,
18) for  full  discussion  of  this  proposal).  In  recent  years,  instruments  have  been
developed [e.g., the Examination of Anomalous Self Experience (EASE)(19) and the
Examination  of  Anomalous  World  Experience  (EAWE)(20)]  that  facilitate  this
approach  and  provide  quantitative  metrics  of  the  type  and  severity  of
phenomenological  disturbances.  The  domains  can  be divided into  constructs and
sub-constructs.  For instance, the domain of selfhood is commonly divided into the
constructs of  basic self  (a pre-reflective,  tacit  level  of  selfhood)  and narrative self
7
(personality, social identity, habits, style, personal history, etc.). The basic self might
be further organised into the subconstructs of cognition and stream of consciousness,
self-awareness  and  presence,  bodily  experiences,  demarcation  of  self-world
boundary,  and  existential  orientation,  as  captured  in  the  sections  of  the  EASE
instrument.  A  phenomenological  study  would  then  investigate,  with  respect  to  a
particular  patient  or  class of  patients,  the experiential  disturbances within  each of
these sub-constructs. 
Let us illustrate this approach by briefly summarising two recent studies. Sass and
Pienkos  (21) studied  selfhood across schizophrenia, melancholia and mania. They
found that self-world boundaries were unstable across the conditions examined, but in
fundamentally different  ways: heightened in melancholia,  diminished in mania and
schizophrenia but the former with an ecstatic or benign mood tone and the latter with
solipsism  and  erosion  of  first-person  perspective  (21).  In  this  case,  the  findings
supported  current  diagnostic  boundaries.  Ratcliffe  (22),  in  contrast,  studied
temporality in  major  depressive  disorder.  He found that  temporal  experience was
disturbed  in  quite  different  ways  within depression.  Patients  varied  on  single  or
multiple constructs/subcontracts of loss of drive/momentum, loss of futural projects,
and loss of futural significance. These findings suggest profound heterogeneity within
the  diagnostic  category  of  major  depressive  disorder  and  provide  preliminary
evidence for subtypes within this category (22). These types of investigations adopt a
dimensional research framework by analysing the specific ways in which a particular
phenomenological  domain  (‘existential  structure’)  might  be  disturbed  across  and
within  diagnostic  categories  (i.e.,  the  severity  and  specific  features  of  this
disturbance). By putting diagnostic boundaries temporarily to one side, using this lens
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of analysis might refract certain disturbances of existential structures (e.g., selfhood,
temporality)  that  are  shared across  conditions,  highlight  distinctions  between
conditions, or identify subtypes within a particular diagnostic category.
The crux of the current proposal is that this dimensional phenomenological analysis of
psychopathology could be overlaid on top of clinical stages. That is, disturbances of
existential  structures,  and  their  constructs  and  subconstructs,  could  be  analysed
according to disorder severity and stage progression. Figure 1 provides a heuristic
illustration of how this approach might be pursued. While panel A presents the clinical
staging  model  as  it  currently  stands,  panel  B  shows  heuristic  examples  of  how
disturbances  of  particular  existential  structures  might  evolve  across  stages  of
disorder. These patterns or trajectories across stages might vary by individual patient
and by type of disorder; variation of type of disorder is illustrated in this animation:
https://s6.gifyu.com/images/animation-40b881647ef7dcebb.gif.  In this illustration, for
example,  disturbances  of  selfhood  are  particularly  characteristic  of  schizophrenia
spectrum disorders and become more pronounced as stages of  disorder  become
more  advanced  (see  (23) for  preliminary  empirical  support  for  this  relationship
between  disturbances  of  selfhood  and  stage  of  disorder,  particularly  over  early
stages). This analysis can be nuanced by examining constructs within the domain of
selfhood. Current evidence, for example, suggests that the construct of basic self is
particularly  relevant  to  schizophrenia  spectrum  disorders  while  the  construct  of
narrative self is more relevant to borderline personality disorder (24-26). Exactly how
this relationship between existential structure and syndrome relates to or develops
across stages of mental disorder is an empirical question invited by this proposed
integrative model.  
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Figure  1  Text:  Heuristic  diagram  of  how  existential  structures  emerging  from  phenomenological
psychopathology can be overlaid on top of clinical stages. Panel A shows the clinical staging model as
it  currently stands.  Panel B shows heuristic examples of  how disturbances of  particular  existential
structures might evolve across stages of disorder.
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While it may appear that clinical staging and phenomenological psychopathology can
prima facie be integrated along these lines, what are the advantages of doing so? We
see at least two benefits:
1.   A clinical  staging-phenomenological  psychopathology integration could provide
different  levels  of  depth to  phenotypic  description  as  required  by  the  clinical  or
research context (12). For example, assigning clinical stage to a particular patient or
group of patients is a useful shorthand in some clinical contexts to succinctly capture
illness severity (e.g., “This is a stage 2 clinical presentation” – that is, a first episode of
serious mental disorder). This use of clinical staging in fact already occurs in some
public  mental  health  services,  e.g.  at  the  end  of  each  patient  consultation  in
headspace youth mental health services  (27). However, describing disturbances of
existential  structures  (phenomenological  psychopathology)  would  clearly  provide
greater detail regarding the specific psychopathological disturbances experienced by
a patient (i.e., it would enhance phenotypic resolution and depth). In some ways, this
may  be  analogous  to  supplementing  description  of  presenting  complaints  with
identification  of  particular  underlying  beliefs  (a  psychological  formulation)  and/or
results of biomedical tests (a medical formulation); however, the emphasis here is on
detailed characterisation of the clinical phenotype rather than on identifying potential
causal contributors to this phenotype. See Table 1 for an example – in this case, the
clinical characterisation of a patient at three levels of detail: 1. Stage 2 disorder, 2.
Severe  positive  psychotic  symptoms  and  mild  depressed  mood,  3.  Basic  self-
disturbances, disturbed temporality and intersubjectivity.
This ‘high resolution’ approach capturing clinical stage and psychopathological detail
may also  be useful  in  other  contexts,  such as  the  development  of  detailed  case
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formulations or construction of treatments plans. For example, a patient with stage 3
disorder characterised by persistently severe depressed mood and disturbances of
intersubjectivity may point towards the clinical relevance of disrupted interpersonal
attachments  and  neglect  during  developmental  years  (predisposing  him/her  to
intersubjectivity disturbances) and difficulty forming a consistent relationship with a
treating team (a factor that has contributed to stage progression by reducing exposure
to treatment). Another example might be a treatment plan for a patient at stage 1b
with attenuated psychotic symptoms and substance dependence with prominent basic
self-disturbances  that  consists  of  comprehensive  psychosocial  treatment  and
substance detoxification and rehabilitation (tailoring treatment to stage of disorder),
combined with treatment elements that target the particular experiential disturbances
characteristic  of  basic  self-disturbance,  such  as  fostering  robust  self-presence
through  body-oriented  strategies,  immersive  activity  and  physical  exercise,  and
‘talking therapy’ that emphasises a shift in the overall framework of altered experience
rather than on specific contents of cognition (28, 29). 
Table 1
Heuristic of how diagnosis might be summarised to integrate clinical stage with 
phenomenological phenotype
2. The
clinical  staging-phenomenological  psychopathology  integration  can  be  conducted







Level of diagnostic information Example
1 Stage of disorder Stage 2
2 Symptoms/signs  Severe acute positive symptoms
 Mild depressed mood




 Disturbance of intersubjectivity
disturbances of existential structures might be captured for a  particular patient,  as
illustrated in the clinical scenarios outlined above. However, the integration might also
apply at a syndromal or disorder level, possibly introducing a useful framework for
research studies. A researcher might ask a phenotypic research question guided by
this  integrated approach,  i.e.,  whether  a  certain  combination of  illness  stage  and
existential structure disturbances are associated with a particular cluster of symptoms
(e.g., Is stage 2 disorder in combination with prominent disturbances of selfhood and
embodiment  associated  with  first  rank  psychotic  symptoms?).  Psychological  or
neurocognitive  hypotheses  regarding  symptom  aetiology  may  emerge  from  this
analysis. Equally, the clinical staging-phenomenological psychopathology integrated
approach may inform risk stratification studies (e.g., Stage 1b patients with prominent
disturbances of affectivity and embodiment may be stratified for increased risk for
progression to stage 2 mood disorder)  and mechanism-focused studies (e.g.,  Are
certain neural circuit dysfunctions associated with a particular combination of illness
stage  and  experiential  disturbances?).  While  phenomenological  phenotypes  and
clinical staging have both already been used independently to guide and organise
biomarker  and  mechanism-focused  studies  (30-41) the  integration  of  these
approaches may maximise these efforts. Biomarkers and mechanisms may not only
vary  by  clinical  stage  or  disturbance  of  particular  existential  structures,  but  by  a
combination of the two. For example, we recently found that the phenomenological
phenotype  of  basic  self-disturbance  and  neurocognitive  and  neurophysiological
measures of source monitoring disturbances varied by stage of psychotic disorder
(becoming more severe as disorder progressed) and that  the  correlation  between
these two levels of analysis also became stronger as disorder progressed (i.e., there
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was  an  interaction  between  stage  of  disorder,  phenomenological  phenotype  and
neural correlate)(30, 31).  
There are clearly a number of challenges that would need to be overcome for the
integrative approach outlined above and we are not proposing that this approach is
ready for ‘primetime’. First, there is the issue of sufficient awareness of and training in
phenomenologically-informed  assessment  of  psychopathology.  As  has  been
observed by a number of  authors [e.g.  see  (42-44)],  this  is a  weakness in many
psychiatry/clinical psychology training programs at present. A second, related issue is
that  of  inter-rater  reliability.  How  reliably  can  these  more  detailed,  nuanced
assessment  approaches  be  implemented?  The  data  to  date  are  actually  quite
encouraging on this front. For example, the EASE, EAWE and the Bonn Scale for the
Assessment of Psychopathology (BSABS) have all demonstrated moderate to strong
(0.6-1.0)  single  item  reliability  coefficients  (19,  20,  45),  certainly  comparable  to
commonly used clinical assessment instruments such as the Brief Psychiatric Rating
Scale [BPRS  (46, 47)]  or the Social  and Occupational Functioning Scale [SOFAS
(48)], and far superior to  structured diagnostic interviews conducted by non-clinicians
(49). These reliability statistics have been achieved in well-trained research-oriented
settings. Perhaps the question should not so much be how these ‘high resolution’
assessments  can  be  transferred  to  everyday  clinical  settings,  but  how  we might
ensure that sophisticated training in psychopathology is widely delivered and accurate
identification tools are deployed for screening and referral  to specialist centres for
further  assessment  and  diagnostic  clarification  when  required.  A  final  challenge,
related to the other two, is the risk that the proposed integrated approach results in
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complexity  that  is  unwieldy  in  clinical  settings.  Rather  than prematurely  foreclose
exploration of the model due to this risk,  we propose testing it  first in specialised
settings, such as early intervention services. 
Conclusion
In  this  opinion  piece,  we  have  considered  points  of  intersection  between  clinical
staging  and  phenomenological  psychopathology’s  perspective  on  clinical
phenotyping.  Domains  identified  in  phenomenological  psychopathology,  such  as
selfhood, embodiment, affectivity, etc., can be overlaid on clinical stages in order to
enrich  and  deepen  the  phenotypes  captured  in  clinical  staging  (‘high  resolution’
clinical phenotypes). This may be of value for complementing diagnosis, enriching
clinical formulation, and informing treatment of individual patients. It may also help
guide  aetiological,  prediction,  and  treatment  research.  The  overlaying  of
phenomenological  domains on clinical  stages may require that these domains are
reformulated  in  dimensional  rather  than  categorial  terms.  This  integrative  project
requires assessment tools that are sensitive and thorough enough to pick up on the
range of relevant psychopathology. Some of these instruments are already available,
such as the EASE, EAWE, BSABS and AMDP System: Manual for Assessment and
Documentation of Psychopathology in Psychiatry. The overlaying of continuum-based
phenomenological  concepts  on  clinical  stages also  needs to  be  approached  in  a
careful manner that does not ‘break apart’ Gestalt concepts such as self- or world-
disturbance, which rely on a certain indivisible relationship between parts (individual
symptoms/signs) and the whole (overall structural shift in experience/expression), into
atomistic elements that lose their psychopathological importance in the process [see
Appendix,  p.1].  The  integration  we  propose  offers  opportunities  for  mutual
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enrichment:  clinical  staging  may  be  enriched  by  introducing  greater  depth  to
phenotypes;  phenomenological  psychopathology  may  be  enriched  by  introducing
stages of severity and disorder progression to phenomenological analysis.
16
References
1. Maj M. Beyond diagnosis in psychiatric practice. Ann Gen Psychiatry. 2020;19:27.
2. McGorry PD. The next stage for diagnosis: validity through utility. World Psychiatry.
2013;12(3):213-5.
3. McGorry PD, Hartmann JA, Spooner R, Nelson B. Beyond the "at risk mental state"
concept: transitioning to transdiagnostic psychiatry. World Psychiatry. 2018;17(2):133-42.
4. McGorry PD, Hickie IB, Yung AR, Pantelis C, Jackson HJ. Clinical staging of psychiatric
disorders: a heuristic framework for choosing earlier, safer and more effective interventions.
Aust N Z J Psychiatry. 2006;40(8):616-22.
5. McGorry PD. Issues for DSM-V: clinical staging: a heuristic pathway to valid nosology
and safer, more effective treatment in psychiatry. Am J Psychiatry. 2007;164(6):859-60.
6. Hartmann  JA,  Nelson  B,  Spooner  R,  et  al.  Broad  clinical  high-risk  mental  state
(CHARMS): Methodology of a cohort study validating criteria for pluripotent risk. Early Interv
Psychiatry. 2019;13(3):379-86.
7. Purcell  R,  Jorm  AF,  Hickie  IB,  et  al.  Transitions  Study  of  predictors  of  illness
progression  in  young  people  with  mental  ill  health:  study  methodology.  Early  Interv
Psychiatry. 2015;9(1):38-47.
8. Addington J,  Liu L,  Goldstein BI,  et al.  Clinical  staging for youth at-risk  for serious
mental illness. Early Interv Psychiatry. 2019;13(6):1416-23.
9. Iorfino F, Scott EM, Carpenter JS, et al. Clinical Stage Transitions in Persons Aged 12 to
25 Years Presenting to Early Intervention Mental Health Services With Anxiety, Mood, and
Psychotic Disorders. JAMA Psychiatry. 2019.
10. Shah JL, Scott, J., McGorry, P.D., Cross, S.P.M., Keshavan, M., Nelson, B., Wood, S.J.,
Marwaha,  S.,  Yung,  A.R.,  Scott, E.M.,  Öngür,  D.,  Conus,  P.,  Henry,  C.,  Hickie,  I.B.,  for  the
International  Working  Group on  Transdiagnostic  Clinical  Staging  in  Youth  Mental  Health.
Transdiagnostic  clinical  staging  in  youth  mental  health:  A  first  international  consensus
statement. World Psychiatry. 2020;19(2):233-42.
11. Shah  JL.  Bringing  Clinical  Staging  to  Youth  Mental  Health:  From  Concept  to
Operationalization (and Back Again). JAMA Psychiatry. 2019.
12. Nelson B, Hartmann JA, Parnas J. Detail, dynamics and depth: useful correctives for
some current research trends. Br J Psychiatry. 2018;212(5):262-4.
13. Stanghellini G, Broome MR, Fernandez AV, Fusar-Poli P, Raballo A, Rosfort R, editors.
The Oxford Handbook of Phenomenological Psychopathology. Oxford: Oxford UP; 2019.
14. Fernandez AV. Phenomenology and Dimensional Approaches to Psychiatric Research
and Classification. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. 2019;26(1):65-75.
15. Fernandez  AV,  Køster  A.  On  the  Subject  Matter  of  Phenomenological
Psychopathology.  In:  Stanghellini  G,  Broome  M,  Fernandez  AV,  Fusar-Poli  P,  Raballo  A,
Rosfort  R,  editors.  The  Oxford  Handbook  of  Phenomenological  Psychopathology.  Oxford:
Oxford University Press; 2019. p. 191–204.
16. Fernandez  AV.  The  Subject  Matter  of  Phenomenological  Research:  Existentials,
Modes, and Prejudices. Synthese. 2017;194(9):3543-62.
17. Martin W, Gergel T, Owen GS. Manic temporality. Philos Psychol. 2018;32(1):72-97.
18. Fernandez  AV.  Clarifying  a  Dimensional  Approach  to  Phenomenological
Psychopathology. Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Psychology. 2019;26(1):81-5.
17
19. Parnas J, Moller P, Kircher T, et al. EASE: Examination of Anomalous Self-Experience.
Psychopathology. 2005;38(5):236-58.
20. Sass  L,  Pienkos  E,  Skodlar  B,  et  al.  EAWE:  Examination  of  Anomalous  World
Experience. Psychopathology. 2017;50(1):10-54.
21. Sass  L,  Pienkos  E.  Varieties  of  self  experience:  A  comparative  phenomenology  of
melancholia,  mania,  and  schizophrenia,  Part  I.  Journal  of  Consciousness  Studies.
2013;20:103-30.
22. Ratcliffe  M.  Varieties  of  temporal  experience  in  depression.  J  Med  Philos.
2012;37(2):114-38.
23. Raballo A, Monducci E, Ferrara M, Fiori Nastro P, Dario C, group R. Developmental
vulnerability  to  psychosis:  Selective  aggregation  of  basic  self-disturbance  in  early  onset
schizophrenia. Schizophr Res. 2018;201:367-72.
24. Zandersen  M,  Parnas  J.  Borderline  personality  disorder  or  a  disorder  within  the
schizophrenia spectrum? A psychopathological study. World Psychiatry. 2019;18(1):109-10.
25. Zandersen  M,  Parnas  J.  Identity  Disturbance,  Feelings  of  Emptiness,  and  the
Boundaries of the Schizophrenia Spectrum. Schizophr Bull. 2019;45(1):106-13.
26. Nelson B, Thompson A, Chanen AM, Amminger GP, Yung AR. Is basic self-disturbance
in ultra-high risk for psychosis ('prodromal') patients associated with borderline personality
pathology? Early Interv Psychiatry. 2013;7(3):306-10.
27. Rickwood DJ, Telford NR, Parker AG, Tanti CJ, McGorry PD. headspace - Australia's
innovation in youth mental health: who are the clients and why are they presenting? Med J
Aust. 2014;200(2):108-11.
28. Sass  L.  Three  Dangers:  Phenomenological  Reflections  on  the  Psychotherapy  of
Psychosis. Psychopathology. 2019;52(2):126-34.
29. Nelson  B,  Torregrossa  L,  Thompson  A,  et  al.  Improving  treatments  for  psychotic
disorders: Beyond cognitive behaviour therapy for psychosis. Psychosis. 2020;In press.
30. Nelson B, Lavoie S, Gaweda L, et al. The neurophenomenology of early psychosis: An
integrative empirical study. Conscious Cogn. 2020;77:102845.
31. Nelson B, Lavoie S, Gaweda L, et al. Testing a neurophenomenological model of basic
self disturbance in early psychosis. World Psychiatry. 2019;18(1):104-5.
32. Sestito M, Raballo A, Umilta MA, et al. Mirroring the self: testing neurophysiological
correlates  of  disturbed  self-experience  in  schizophrenia  spectrum.  Psychopathology.
2015;48(3):184-91.
33. Sestito  M,  Raballo  A,  Stanghellini  G,  Gallese  V.  Editorial:  Embodying  the  Self:
Neurophysiological Perspectives on the Psychopathology of Anomalous Bodily Experiences.
Front Hum Neurosci. 2017;11:631.
34. Martin  B,  Wittmann  M,  Franck  N,  Cermolacce  M,  Berna  F,  Giersch  A.  Temporal
structure  of  consciousness  and  minimal  self  in  schizophrenia.  Frontiers  in  psychology.
2014;5:1175.
35. Martin B, Franck N, Cermolacce M, et al. Fragile temporal prediction in patients with
schizophrenia is related to minimal self disorders. Sci Rep. 2017;7(1):8278.
36. Martin B,  Franck  N,  Cermolacce  M,  Coull  JT,  Giersch  A.  Minimal  Self  and  Timing
Disorders in Schizophrenia: A Case Report. Front Hum Neurosci. 2018;12:132.
37. Schultze-Lutter F,  Debbane M, Theodoridou A,  et al.  Revisiting the Basic Symptom
Concept: Toward Translating Risk Symptoms for Psychosis into Neurobiological Targets. Front
Psychiatry. 2016;7:9.
18
38. Poletti  M,  Gebhardt  E,  Raballo  A.  Corollary  Discharge,  Self-agency,  and  the
Neurodevelopment of the Psychotic Mind. JAMA Psychiatry. 2017;74(11):1169-70.
39. Bonoldi  I,  Allen  P,  Madeira  L,  et  al.  Basic  Self-Disturbances  Related  to  Reduced
Anterior  Cingulate  Volume  in  Subjects  at  Ultra-High  Risk  for  Psychosis.  Front  Psychiatry.
2019;10:254.
40. Wood SJ, Yung AR, McGorry PD, Pantelis C. Neuroimaging and treatment evidence for
clinical staging in psychotic disorders: from the at-risk mental state to chronic schizophrenia.
Biol Psychiatry. 2011;70(7):619-25.
41. McGorry  P,  Keshavan  M,  Goldstone  S,  et  al.  Biomarkers  and  clinical  staging  in
psychiatry. World Psychiatry. 2014;13(3):211-23.
42. Andreasen NC.  DSM and the death of  phenomenology  in america:  an example of
unintended consequences. Schizophr Bull. 2007;33(1):108-12.
43. Mullen  PE.  A  modest  proposal  for  another  phenomenological  approach  to
psychopathology. Schizophr Bull. 2007;33(1):113-21.
44. Parnas J, Gallagher S. Phenomenology and the interpretation of psychopathological
experience.  In:  Kirmayer  LJ,  Leemelson R,  Cummings  CA,  editors.  Re-visioning  psychiatry:
Cultural  phenomenology,  critical  neuroscience  and  global  mental  health.  New  York:
Cambridge University Press; 2015. p. 65-80.
45. Vollmer-Larsen A, Handest P, Parnas J. Reliability of measuring anomalous experience:
the Bonn Scale for the Assessment of Basic Symptoms. Psychopathology. 2007;40(5):345-8.
46. Flemenbaum  A,  Zimmermann  RL.  Inter-  and  intra-rater  reliability  of  the  Brief
Psychiatric Rating Scale. Psychol Rep. 1973;32(3):783-92.
47. Bell M, Milstein R, Beam-Goulet J, Lysaker P, Cicchetti D. The Positive and Negative
Syndrome  Scale  and  the  Brief  Psychiatric  Rating  Scale.  Reliability,  comparability,  and
predictive validity. J Nerv Ment Dis. 1992;180(11):723-8.
48. Morosini PL, Magliano L, Brambilla L, Ugolini S, Pioli R. Development, reliability and
acceptability of a new version of the DSM-IV Social and Occupational Functioning Assessment
Scale (SOFAS) to assess routine social functioning. Acta Psychiatr Scand. 2000;101(4):323-9.
49. Nordgaard J, Revsbech R, Saebye D, Parnas J. Assessing the diagnostic validity of a
structured  psychiatric  interview  in  a  first-admission  hospital  sample.  World  Psychiatry.
2012;11(3):181-5.
19
